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THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION
Evidence from West German Public Opinion
Richard L. Merritt+
The 1953 Bundestag election is frequently interpreted as a
critical milestone in postwar West Germany's political history:
Some saw its outcome, which gave Chancellor Adenauer's CDU/CSU
45 .2% of the vote (31 .0% in 1949) and his coalition 63
.8% (and
a constitution-changing 68 .4% of Bundestag seats), as a major
surprise, as proof that West Germans had firmly accepted demo-
cracy, or as simply another election, to be explained by the
appeal of political issues, party identification, the candidates'
personalities, special political circumstances (e
.g. U.S. inter-
vention), or the sociological characteristics of the voters
themselves.
The paper looks into the validity of a particular set of public
opinion surveys on the 1953 Bundestag election, commissioned by
the Evaluation Staff of the Office of Public Affairs, U
.S.
High Commission for Germany (HICOG).
The data from the 1953 election study show that neither the
electoral outcome nor the degree of West Germans' acceptance
of democratic institutions and practices should have come as a
surprise . Specific issues seemed to play little role, but
differences in general mood,. related to several such issues,
were important . Party identification as such was important for
only a few
. Voters subsequently saw Adenauer's personality and
the general mood he represented as the most important element
in the outcome ; the special circumstances mentioned by several
writers were insignificant in the voters' consciousness . The
data suggest that social class and religion were important
variables determining voters' predispositions, but the lack
of theoretic orientation in the study makes impossible any
definite conclusion about their weight vis-a-vis other variables
such as issues.
Few observers were indifferent to the outcome of the 1953 parlia-
mentary election in West Germany
. The United States State Department
termed the results "gratifying", and saw in them a vindication Of
American policy toward the Federal Republic
.(l) French spokesmen
were warier
. Above all they feared that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's
success would increase United States pressure on France to move
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toward the military rehabilitation of West Germany
. But the British
were happy enough that extremist factions had gone down to defeat,
and that at least one major continental country seemed assured of
a strong and stable government
. The Soviet press, interpreting the
West German electoral context as one of terror, saw in Adenauer's
victory both "a serious threat" to European peace and an- end to
the prospects for German unity.
The election of September 6, 1953 had indeed altered the West Ger-
man political _scene
. As Table 1 shows, it gave Adenauer's governing
coalition an even larger majority than it had obtained in the 1949
federal election
. His own party, the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU), together with its Bavarian sister, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), increased its share of votes by almost half, from 31
.0
to 45
.2 per cent, and its number of Bundestag seats from 139 to 243,
giving it just one vote less than an absolute majority
. The major
opposition party, the Social Democratic party (SPD), gained a million
votes and 20 additional seats in parliament, but dropped slightly in
its share of the vote total
. The CDU/CSU and its conservative coali-
tion partners, the Free Democratic party (FDP) and the German party
(DP), had controlled a slim majority in the First Bundestag (208 of
402 scats, or 51 .7 per cent)
. The coalition dominating the Second
Bundestag, which included the new Refugee party (GB/BHE) as well as
the CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP, enjoyed a constitution-changing majority
of 68.6 per cent (334 of 487 parliamentary seats) . The number of
parties obtaining representation in the Bundestag declined from
eleven to six
. Among the casualties were the Communist party (KPD),
which lost its parliamentary representation altogether, and various
rightist factions.
Given such shifts in voting over the course of four years, it is not
surprising that journalists, scholars, and others have showered
attention upon the 1953 Bundestag election . The veritable mythology.
which has grown up about the election itself, what produced the
specific outcome and what it meant, has in part prevented observers
of a later generation from understanding its true place in postwar
German developments . This paper seeks to cut through some of the
mythology by examining available public opinion data . Its focus,
however, is less on the election itself than the usefulness of a
particular body of survey data for understanding it--as,well as
by implication, other aspects of postwar West Germany's political
path, such as rearmament and moves toward European unity, about
which similar bodies of data exist . The paper uses data about the
1953 election as a means to explore the uses and limitations of
these kinds of data.
VIEWS OF THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION
Among the many interpretations given the 1953 parliamentary election
in the Federal Republic of Germany, a prominent one stresses the
element of surprise . It would seem that few, even among those who
had hoped most ardently for it, had anticipated the dramatic nature
of the CDU/CSU's success . President Dwight D
. Eisenhower, for in-
stance, whose Secretary of State had made an open bid to influence
voters in the election, thought its results better than the United
States had "dared to expect" .(2) Even those closely attuned to
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Table 1 :
	
Bundestag Election Results, 1949 and 1953
Voting Participation
1949 1953
Eligible voters : 31 .207.620 33.121 .066
Valid votes cast : 23.732 .298 27 .551 .376
Percentage valid votes : 78.5% 83.2%
Second Votes Cast
1949 1953
Votes Cast Bundestag Seats Votes Cast Bundestag Seats
Number
	
% Number % Number %
	
Number %
CDU/CSU 7 .359.084
	
31 .0% 139* 34.6% 12 .444 .055 45.2% 243* 49 .9%
SPD 6 .934.975
	
29 .2 131 32 .8 7 .944 .953 28.8 151 31 .0
FDP/DVP 2 .829.920
	
11 .9 52* 12.9 2 .629 .169 9.5 48* 9 .9
GB/BHE - - 1 .616 .956 5 .9 27* 5 .5-
	
-
DP 939.934
	
4 .0 17* 4 .2 896 .230 3 .2 15* 3 .1
KPD 1 .361 .706
	
5 .7 15 3 .7 607 .761 2 .2 - -
BP 986.478
	
4 .2 17 4.2 465 .641 1 .7 - -
GVP - - 318 .476 1 .1 -
DRP 1 429.031
	
1 .8 5 1 .2 295 .746 1 .1
DZP 727.505
	
3..1 10 2 .5 217 .078 0 .8 32 0 .6
DNS -
	
- - - 70 .726 0 .3 - -
SSW 75.388
	
0 .3 1 0 .2 44 .585 0 .2 - -
Others 2 .088.377
	
8 .8 15 3.7 - - - -
Total 23 .732.398 100 .0% 402 100.0% 27 .551 .376 100 .0% 487 100 .0%
* Coalition partners
2 In 1949, the DReP/DKPIncluding one CDU member, who joined the coalition.
Party Abbreviations
CDU/CSU
	
Christian Democratic Union and, in Bavaria,Christian Social Union
SPD
	
Social Democratic Party of Germany
FDP/DVP Free Democratic Party and, in Baden Württemberg, Democratic Peoples
Party
GB/BHE
	
All-German Party, and Refugee Party (literally : Federation of Those
Expelled from their Homeland and Deprived of their Rights)
DP
	
German Party
KPD
	
Communist Party of Germany
BP
	
Bavarian Party
GVP
	
All-German Peoples Party
DRP	 German Reich Party (successor, in effect, of the German Party of the
Right (DReP) and German Conservative Party (DKP)
DZP
	
German Center Party
DNS
	
German National Convention
SSW
	
South Schleswig Voters Association
Source :
	
Kurt Horstmann, "Die Wahl zum 2 . Deutschen Bundestag am 6 . September
1953", Wirtschaft and Statistik, 5 :9 (September 1953), 383-390, passim.
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German domestic politics, the argument continues, had little basis
for predicting the electoral outcome . As the West German political
historian, Heino Kaack, has pointed out, the coalition's clearcut
victory was especially surprising if one took as a point of com-
parison the results of preceding state parliamentary elections (3):
In eleven such elections between 1949 and 1953, the SPD had won
32 .1 per cent of the cumulated vote, against only 29 .2 per cent
for the CDU/CSU, and had emerged as the strongest single party in
eight of them .(4)
A second interpretation sees the election as West Germany's response
to the question of whether or not it was prepared for democracy.
Would the Germans, as unpredictable as many thought them to be,
prove themselves capable of conducting democratically their first
free elections in more than two decades? The answer given to such
a rhetorical question is almost uniformly a resounding "Yes!" After
all, five of six eligible voters had cast their ballots (in contrast
to 62 per cent in the 1952 presidential election in the United
States), and three of four of these had gone to the two major
parties . Extremist parties of the right and left had lost the
voters' favor since the 1949 election : Jubilant editorial writers
for The New York Times assured us with a great sigh of relief that
the Good had in fact triumphed over the Confused as well as the
downright Evil:
"In an election which smashed all precedents and swept away much of
the debris of a dismal past the people of Western Germany have
rolled up a landslide victory for Chancellor Adenauer, and have
therewith also cast their votes in favor of the West, of European
unification and of a common defense of Western civilization against
the new barbarism threatening from the East . By doing so they have
removed all doubt as to where the new Germany stands . They have
made it not only a stanch ally of the West against Communist
aggression but also a cornerstone in the new European order, which
has as its ultimate goal an United States of Europe able to restore
the Old Continent to its proper place in the world" .(5)
Through more than four years of direct military occupation and
another four of tutelage under the high commissioners, the Western
Allies and progressively minded Germans had created a democracy
capable of attracting the support of most citizens.
Still a third interpretation finds in the 1953 Bundestag election
nothing extraordinary whatever . Whatever their recent past, with
its Nazi dictatorship and Allied control, by 1953 West Germans were
indistinguishable from people in other industrial democracies as
far as their voting was concerned . Such ideas would later find a
more formal setting within various theories of convergence, accor-
ding to which differences among national populations, institutions,
and processes disappear as they encounter the common phenomenon
of industrialization .(6) In the 1950s the argument was narrower:
The same things that drive Americans to vote for one candidate or
party rather than another also motivate Germans, Swiss, Italians,
Swedes, and others.
Proponents of such a cross-national perspective differ widely,
however, when it comes to specifying what it is that is primarily
responsible for the individual voting decision . For some the
crucial element is political issues . West German voters, in this
- 7 -
view, analyzed the positions taken by parties on such issues as
rearmament and social welfare, and balloted accordingly on election
day . Overseas observers, of course, tended to stress issues of
foreign policy. This is the thrust of the entire editorial in The
New York Times commenting on the election (and cited in part eerier).
The same newspaper headlined its lead article on the first page,
"Adenauer Victory Called a Mandate for United Europe" ; and in it
its author, Clifton Daniels, pointedly noted that the defeated SPD
has "put the reunification of Germany ahead of integration" .(7)
Germans, too, underscored the overriding importance of foreign
policy . "Firmer ties with the West or not, a corresponding policy
toward European integration, and shaping our relations with the
United States" ; wrote Konrad Adenauer in his memoirs (8), "were
at the center of debates during the 1953 Bundestag election".
A second group of electoral analysts say that it is less a rational
consideration of issues than the voter's party identification that
determines how that individual votes . The basic idea is that
individuals learn in their formative years, in the home, at school,
or in their place of work, to associate themselves with a particular
party ; and that in subsequent years they look to their party for
cues on how to organize their own thinking and select the candidates
for which they will vote
. What makes this proposition problematic
are the discontinuities in German political history
. That is, for
people over the age of 40, there was only one party in 1953, the
SPD, which could be said to have existed at the time of their birth
or early years ; and for those whose formative years were during
the Third Reich, there was no continuity whatever in party structures.
Moreover, the political parties of the 1950s were only more or less
the organizational and ideological successors to those of the 1920s.
The amount of continuity that did exist, together with the possibility
of forming new identifications with postwar parties, seemed to many
writers to lend credibility to the mechanisms implied in the notion
of party identification
. In this view, Germans who had been raised
as Social Democrats would vote in 1953 for the SPD regardless of
what platform and candidates the party put forward
. Those identified
with the Center party of Weimar days would experience equally few
qualms in supporting the CDU/CSU
. The interesting question for
proponents of the idea of party identification as the main causal
factor in voting would be the 1953 electoral decisions of those
who had earlier supported parties which had disappeared or enjoyed
no prospects for future success.
In contrast to an emphasis on issue-oriented rationality or else
party identification, a third argument stresses the role of the
candidates' personalities
. People vote for the individual, this
argument runs, who seems best able to cope with the broad range
of issues likely to face their government, irrespective of the
individual's party affiliation or views on some specific issue.
The focus of most writers on the 1953 Bundestag election was Konrad
Adenauer
. His strength of character, expressed in his remarkable
rise to power in postwar Germany, guidance of the Federal Republic's
first four years, and command of the techniques . of electioneering
(in marked contrast to his SPD opponent, Erich Ollenhauer,
	
could
not help but impress voters one way or another . The mantle of
greatness in which publicists of the late 1950s regularly clothed
Adenauer was not much in evidence in the accounts of 1953
.(9)
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There was nonetheless a clear recognition of his key role in the
CDU/CSU's victory . As an American correspondent wrote, "the outcome
was primarily a tribute to the political skill and personality of
the 'old man', as they call him" .(10) More significantly and, given
Germanys recent past, more disturbingly, some writers noted in
the wake of Adenauer's smashing electoral victory the beginnings
of political apotheosis . In what the British journalist, Terence
Prittie, termed "a flowery and flatulent tribute", for instance,
the editor of the conservative Die Welt, Hans Zehrer, wrote that
"We are witnessing in Germany today a mysterious process by which
an entire people is fusing with the person of its Chancellor" .(11)
Such statements make it easy to accept the proposition that West
Germans saw the 1953 election as a struggle for or against a single
man, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
Other analysts seeking an explanation for German voting patterns
in 1953 deny the importance of such systematic, persistent factors
as orientations toward issues, parties, and the personalities of
leading candidates . For them, it was a peculiar set of specialpolitical circumstances which conspired to give Adenauer and the
CDU/CSU its victory . T us Heino Kaack writes:
"The CDU found itself advantaged vis-a-vis the other parties since
it had more campaign funds at its disposal, could capitalize on its
position as the party in , power, and point to its concrete accomplish-
ments . Moreover, it distinguished itself with respect to other
parties through its especially well thought out electoral
propaganda, which for the first time rested on the work ofopinio
researchers" .(12)
Then, too, the June 17, 1953 uprising of East German workers made
a contribution to the CDU/CSU's campaign . Popular interpretations
of uprising, beaten down by Soviet tanks, saw the tragedy as proof
that the Soviet Union would not permit the two Germanies to draw
closer together, that giving up the prospects for West German
rearmament and closer ties with other West European countries in
the hope of attaining German reunification was at best chimerical,
at worst a guarantee of ultimate Soviet control over the Federal
Republic and all of West Europe . Socialist propaganda urging a
neutralized, reunified Germany had a hollow ring 'CO many who heard
it .(13)
A special circumstance that especially angered Social Democrats
was American intervention in behalf of Chancellor Adenauer .(14)
American leaders made no bones about their desire to see Adenauer
re-elected . The five months before the election witnessed:
- an invitation for Adenauer to , visit the United States in April,
followed by a triumphal welcome in Hamburg upon his return to
West Germany;
-
an effort to postpone until after the election a scheduled Four-
Power conference (which, Socialists argued, could make progress
toward German reunification and thus undercut the CDU/CSU's
arguments);
-
offers of foodstuffs for East Germans after the June 17th
uprising--a humanitarian gesture which, it was argued, the
government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was bound
to reject, but which would in the meantime dramatize the inhumanity
of the GDR regime and the impossibility of working with it ;
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- a conference in Washington of the Western foreign ministers, who
promised to persist in their pursuit of German reunification, but
only on the condition that the Soviet and GDR governments were
prepared to make substantial concessions;
- a letter of late July from President Eisenhower to Chancellor
Adenauer, which supported fully the latter's foreign policy
position; and
- a statement on September 3 by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, made at a press conference, which said that Germany's
future and its reunification rested upon Adenauer's re-election,
as did the future of German-American relations.
For his part, Adenauer did not go much out of his way to deny the
allegations, for a main principle of his campaign was that the
Federal Republic needed to cooperate with the United States, a
task for which he was eminently suited.
A final proposition explains West German voting behavior in 1953
in terms of the sociological characteristics of the voters.
The argument is fairly simple : The complexities of politics lead
individuals to search for anchoring points on which to base their
behavior; the most reliable of these are ultimately the perceptions
and behaviors of the social milieu in which these people grew up
and/or live as adults
. Thus members of the working class, who
frequently live in the same area and share common life styles, will
vote for "their" party, that is, the one for which all their friends
and neighbors vote
. Believers, especially Catholics, will vote for
the only party which includes "Christian" as part of its name,
since the symbolism implies a community of like-minded people
. The
persistence over time of strong correlations between such social
background characteristics and electoral behavior argues strongly
for using the former to predict the latter .(15)
Observers looked at the 1953 Bundestag election, then, and saw
many things . The typical account appearing in leading newspapers
or political magazines included a bit of everything-surprise at
the magnitude of the CDU/CSU's victory, delight because of high
voter turnout and the orderly way in which the election proceeded
or because of the declining fortunes of extremist parties, and
explanations that ranged from the importance of particular issues
through the force of Adenauer's personality to comfortable knowledge
that certain groups, such as workers, "always" vote in a certain
way
. In terms of a theory of electoral behavior, some of these
reactions and proposed explanations are mutually compatible . Others,
however, are not . Or, phrasing the concern more precisely, it
would be useful to know how much of the electoral outcome was due
to a rational weighing of issues and parties' positions, and how
much to such nonrational elements as the voter's position in
society.
Public opinion data can contribute to our understanding of the
political, social, and psychological processes at work in the
1953 Bundestag election as well as the more general phenomenon
of West German electoral behavior . What has limited the use of such
data in historical analyses has often been their inaccessibility--a
term used in a double sense here
. First, it is sometimes difficult
to locate relevant data, particularly while they are fresh . Those
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who commission and pay for surveys are seldom interested in
releasing more information than necessary, since it might serve
to assist their competitors ; and surveying agencies . are contractually
bound not to release their clients' data until after a specified
time (often two years) . Even reports in the public domain are
difficult to find since few research libraries bother to seek them
out or place them in their permanent collections . The raw data,
whether on punchcards or magnetic tape, require fairly extensive
computational skills' and facilities to analyze.
A second type of inaccessibility is more a psychological matter . A
scholar studying political developments in the years since World
War II sometimes shies away from public opinion data because of
unfamiliarity with their scientific bases . At first glance it may
seem to be a dubious proposition, for instance, that a sample of
a few hundred persons, however well chosen, can accurately reflect
the mood of an entire national population . (In 1953, even true
believers were still suffering from the setback of five years
earlier, when the Gallup organization had predicted Thomas E.
Dewey's victory over Harry S . Truman.)(16) Similarly, the fact that
slight differences in the wording of questions can produce variation
in the distribution of responses -and shameless use by politicians
and others of questions worded in a way to encourage respondents
to give the desired answer-gives rise to other doubts . During the
hotly contested elections of the 1970s, when surveying agencies
working for rival candidates published mutually contradictory
results, it seemed to some more reasonable to ignore the whole
surveying enterprise than to inquire into differences in sampling,
wording, interviewing, and analytic assumptions that accounted for
the varying results.
Such doubts naturally arise in any consideration of public opinion
surveys conducted in 1953 in the Federal Republic . If we wish to
utilize the results of these surveys in understanding German voting
behavior, then we must pay close attention to their validity . Here
is clearly not the place to discuss at length the principles and
techniques of survey research .(17) Of more moment is the task of -
assessing the validity of a particular set of surveys : those
conducted for the United States High Commission in Germany (HICOG)
that focus on the 1953 Bundestag election . After exploring several
approaches to this task we shall return to the question of what
the substantive content of these surveys has to tell us about some
of the views of the election expressed above.
VALIDATING THE HICOG SURVEYS
Very early in their occupation of Germany, American military
officials had understood the usefulness of public opinion surveys
for their own purposes . Even before fighting had died down in some
instances, social psychologists and sociologists in the Psycho-
logical Warfare Division of the U.S . Army entered towns to survey
their populations' potential for resistance, attitudes toward-
Nazism, and expectations about the pending military occupation.
By October 1945 informal surveying had been institutionalized by
the Opinion Survey, Section of the Information Control Division,
Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), which
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subsequently conducted 72 major surveys in the American zone of
occupation . Topics explored by these OMGUS surveys were as diverse
as attitudes toward Hitler, bathing habits, the growing split among
the wartime Allies, and readership of newspapers and magazines .(18)
With the formal end of the military occupation in September 1949,
the United States High Commission for Germany (HICOG) replaced the
Office of Military Government, and the Opinion Survey Section became
the Reaction Analysis Staff (later Evaluation Staff) within the
HICOG Office of Public Affairs . Surveying operations, under the
direction of Dr . Leo P . Crespi, continued unabated . By the end of
1950 the Reaction Analysis Staff had both expanded its sample to
include the whole of the Federal Republic and engaged the newly-
formed Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen (DIVO) to conduct the
fieldwork . The HICOG staff carried out more than 100 surveys of
West German public opinion during its five and a half years of
existence, and wrote 237 reports ranging in length from four to
369 pages (with the average report 33 pages long) .(19) The
Evaluation Staff later became part of the Research Staff of the
Office of Public Affairs, United States Embassy, when on May 1955
the Federal Republic attained virtually complete sovereignty.
On December 11, 1953 the HICOG Evaluation Staff issued a 72-page
report (Series 2, Report No . 191) discussing "A Survey Analysis
of the Factors Underlying the Outcome of the 1953 German Federal
Election" . It reported data from three sets of surveys : almost
two dozen separate pollings from March 1951 to September 1953 which
asked respondents about their preferences among the various
political parties ; a survey conducted in the two weeks before the
election, which served as the basis for predicting the electoral
outcome (in a separate, unpublished report circulated the day before
the election itself) ; and a pair of post-election surveys carried
out in mid-September and late October 1953 . The unavailability of
data cards for these surveys makes any attempt to evaluate their
findings rest primarily on what the Evaluation Staff wrote in its
report of December 11.
Reliability of DIVO Surveys . One point that will not be discussed
here is the reliability (or reproducibility) of public opinion
surveys conducted by DIVO . Like any other commercial polling agency,
it used up-to-date procedures for designing, carrying out, and
analyzing its surveys . DIVO staff associates worked closely with
HICOG officials to develop questions, which were then tried out
(or pretested) to make sure that almost all potential respondents
would find them unambiguous, and fit the questions into a suitable
format or sequence that would, for example, avoid initial questions
that might bias responses to later ones . The common technique for
selecting respondents was stratified random sampling .(20) An entire
population is divided by successive steps into a set of discrete
categories -first by region, for example, and then each region by
size of community, and each community by sex so that one discrete
category might comprise women in large cities in Schleswig- Hol-
stein-from each of which is drawn at random a designated number
of respondents . DIVO trained its own interviewers, supervised them
during their fieldwork, and verified the thoroughness of their
work .(21) Despite the absence in HICOG reports of any searching
examination of the procedures used by DIVO, available clues (22)
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and the firm's general reputation for competence suggest high
quality work on which scholars nowadays can continue to rely.
As important as the reliability of DIVO's surveys is the extent to
which its results can be validated by the test of independent data.
It is possible, after all, although hardly likely, that basic flaws
in its procedures for sampling and questioning the West German
population could obviate the usefulness of DIVO's findings, the
fact that the agency could reproduce its results with a high degree
of accuracy notwithstanding
. The following sections will compare
the findings reported by HICOG analysts with those drawn from other
public opinion surveys (some conducted by other commercial agencies),
an official sample of voters conducted at the pollingbooths on
election day, and, as a check on the predictive power of the HICOG
data, the actual results of the 1953 Bundestag election.
Pre-Election Surveys . The United States High Commission was not, of
course, the only party interested in this election . Closely attuned
to business and its techniques for marketing products, and recognizing
the potential usefulness of market research for their electoral
campaign, CDU/CSU leaders commissioned the Institut fur Demoskopie
(IfD) in Allensbach-am-Bodensee to conduct continuing surveys of
West German political attitudes . More generally, the Allensbach
institute has conducted and reported on monthly surveys since
1947 .(23) Another commercial agency which has conducted election
surveys is the EMNID-Institut GmbH in Bielefeld . It made available
to Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber for his study of the 1953 election data
cards from three nationwide surveys conducted in early July, mid-
August, and late August 1953 .(24) Finally, DIVO conducted another
election study, separate from its periodic surveys for the High
Commission, for the UNESCO Institute for SocialResearch, Cologne
under the direction of Erich Reigrotzki .(25) Fieldwork for the
UNESCO survey was performed between July 4 and August 30, with a
sample of 3 .246 respondents.
Differences among polling agencies in both sampling procedures and
the way in which they worded questions about the voters' preferences
among parties make any direct comparison among responses difficult
at best . A voter might consistently respond to a question, "Would
you please tell me which party you like best?" by saying "None",
and yet name a party when asked, "For which party will you probably
cast your vote at the coming elections?" In all likelihood the same
randomly selected sample would respond still differently to yet
another question : "If the Bundestag election were to be held
tomorrow, which party would you like to see get the largest number
of votes?" Even the same question asked at different times of the
same sample may, because of events intervening between the two
pollings, elicit varying responses.
Taking into account these sources of possible variation, it still
makes sense to ask how the HICOG data measured up to those produced
in other surveys . Table 2 shows that several ways of asking about
party preference in July and August 1953 yielded roughly similar
results . The data in this table are based solely upon the responses
of individuals who named a particular party ; those who indicated
that they were not eligible to vote, did not intend to vote, or
had no party preference were excluded from the calculations .(26)
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Table 2: Comparison of Pre-Election Surveys
Number Giving Of Those ExpressingaParty Preference Avg.
of
	
Party
	
FDP,
	
Total-
	
Diff.
Fieldwork
	
Respon- Pref- CDU/ DP,
	
Coal-
	
from
Date
	
dents erence CSU BHE
	
ition
	
SPD Other
	
Vote*
HICOG-I
Question : " Would you please tell me which party you like best?"
a. July
	
625
	
58.0% 41 .4% 15.5% (56 .9%)
	
37 .9%
	
5 .2%±4.5
b. August
	
670
	
58 .0
	
46 .6 45 .5
	
(62 .1 )
	
34 .5	 3.5	 ± 3 .5
c. Aug 22-Sep 3
	
664
	
61 .0 . 50 .8
	
18 .0
	
(68.9 )
	
29.5
	
1 .6
	
-3 .2
Weighted Avg . 1959 59.0 46.4 16.4 (62 .8 )33.8	 3.4 ±3.1
HICOG-II
Question : For which party will you probably cast your vote at the coming
elections?" (Asked of those entitled and intending to vote)
Aug 22-Sep 3
	
664
	
65 .1
	
50 .3
	
15 .3
	
(65 .7 )
	
29.5
	
4 .9
	
12 .9
EMNID
Question :
	
If the next Bundestag election were to . take place now, would
you vote? For which party would you vote?"
a. July 3-10
	
c .2000
	
63.2
	
41 .8
	
25 .3
	
(67 .-1 )
	
27 .9
	
5 .1
	
t3 .3
b. August 11-16 c .-2000
	
60.8 38.2
	
25 .0
	
(63 .2 ) 29.0
	
7 .9
	
± 3 .5
c. August 20-28 c .2000
	
67.2
	
40 .7
	
25 .9
	
(66 .7 )
	
25 .9
	
7 .4	 ±3.7
Weighted Avg.c.6000 63.7 40.3 25.4 (65.7 ) 27.5 6.8 3.4
party would you vote?"
a. Jul 4-Aug 30
	
1785
	
81,0
	
38.3
	
18 .5
	
(56 .8 )
b. Jul 4-Aug 30
	
1694
	
72 .0
	
44.4
	
18 .1
	
(62 .5 )
	
Weighted Avg . 34.9
	
WI- 18.3 (59 .4 )
IfD (Allensbach)
Question : "Which party is closest to your viewpoint?"
Jul-Sep
	
c .2000tc.65 .0* 38.5
	
21 .5
	
(60 .0 )
Election Results
September 6
	
45.2
	
18 .6
	
(63 .8 )
UNESCO
Question A : "If the Bundestag election were to be held tomorrow, which party
would you like to see get the largest number of votes?"
Question 8: "If the Bundestag election were to beheld tommorrow, for which
32.1
	
11 .1
	
±3 .5
30.6
	
6 .9
	
10 .9
3T:T
	
7-
29.2
	
10 .8
	
13.4
28.8
	
7 .4
ources (for full references, see the footnotes cited below)
HICOG I and II: HICOG, Series 2, No . 191, December 11, 1953, pp, 1-2 (fn .19).
EMNID: Günter Herzig, "Die Befragungen von EMNID and DIVO," pp 426-427 (fn .24).
UNESCO: Reigrotzki, Soziale Verflechtungen, p . 121 (fn .20).
IfD: Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955, pp . 252-253 (fn .23).
* Average of each surveys differences from the actual election results for four
categories of votes : CDU/CSU, Other Coalition (FDP, DP, FDP), SPD, Other Parties.
* Figures taken from a graph which cumulates results by quarter.
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Whatever the differences shown in Table 2 ;
. the tendency is the
same' for all the surveys : clear electoral predominance for the
CDU/CSU, particularly in the event that it should ; as it in fact,
did, create a new coalition similar to that of the First Bundestag.
Compared to the actual results of the election, the average survey's
reading for each of four categories of votes (CDU/CSU ; other
coalition parties (FDP, DP, and BHE) ; SPD; and other parties)
differed 3 .3 percentage points
. HICOG surveys produced responses
still closer to the real vote, with differences averaging 3
.1 and
2
.9 percentage points, respectively . For the HICOG question asked
at three different times in July and August, the amount of variation
from the final tabulation decreased markedly from one survey to
the next.
Without going into details, some other aspects of Table 2 merit
attention. One is the popularity among HICK respondents of the
CDU/CSU . As many as a tenth of those who expressed party preferences
shifted in favor of Adenauer's party from early July to late August.
(Note, however, the static results of the EMNID surveys
.) Such
data suggest that the Chancellor's campaign was gaining momentum
as election day neared
. Second, in responses in late August to
both HICOG questions, about five per cent more of the committed
sample indicated a preference for the CDU/CSU than the percentage
of voters who actually cast their ballots for the party . (The
UNESCO survey asking about intended votes, in the field during
the entire period covered by the threeHICOG surveys, produced
results in terms of CDU/CSU voting very close to the average of
the HICK pollings ; Christian Union adherents were persistently
underrepresented among respondents to EMNID surveys)
. This may
simply indicate that CDU/CSU voters made up their minds earlier
or felt freer about
. giving interviewers their views--a possibility
the effects of which would be exaggerated by the fact that those
still straddling the political fence or reluctant to give infor-
mation about their party preference would have been, omitted in the
distribution by party shown in Table 2 . Implicit in this possibility
is a third point . Numerous voting studies have found that voters
supporting fringe parties, particularly communist, ultra-rightist,
or other parties which are unpopular in the nation at large, are
more likely than others to refuse to give information or even lie
about their voting intentions .(27) HICK surveys vastly underestimated
the number of people indentifying with the FRG's politically marginal
parties : In late August, for example, its sample of 664 West Germans
uncovered none supporting the Communist party, whereas only a few
days later 2 .2 per cent of the electorate voted for the KPD.
Comparing the pre-election surveys of different polling agencies
lends some confidence to a more general use of HICK data . Whatever
differences there may be among these surveys, the central fact is
that they are basically alike in capturing the voters' mood . Not
a single sampling, for instance, gave the Social Democrats a lead
over the Christian Union parties ; and all found that a continuation
of the coalition that the CDU/CSU had forged with other conservative
parties (including the Refugee party, which had not existed in 1949
and thus had no representation in the First Bundestag (28)) would
rest on an overwhelming majority of votes . The differences that
exist are not greater than sampling error or the consequences of
alternative phrasings of questions would lead us to expect .
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Comparisons over Time . Another strategy can test to see whether or
not the differences noted above are merely artifacts of the
technology of surveying : looking at how respondents react over time
to similar questions asked by different polling agencies
. This
strategy begins with the assumption that two questions with somewhat
different wordings are similar to the extent that they tap the same
underlying dimension of attitudes among some set of respondents.
Accordingly, a polling agency will elicit virtually identical
responses to highly similar questions asked of a single sample or
two simultaneous samples drawn on the basis of a standard
procedure.(29) If two agencies ask similar questions of their own samples,
separately drawn according to possibly varying procedures, then the
degree of congruence in the distribution of responses may be used
to indicate the degree of similarity in their respective sampling
designs.
Figure 1 shows responses, averaged for quarter-year periods from
mid-1951 to late 1953, to two questions asked by different polling
institutes :(30)
1. HICK : "Would you please tell me which party you like best?"
2. IfD :
	
"Which party is closest to your viewpoint?"
Let us assume that the two questions are similar
. (Whether or not this
assumption is valid is, of course, an empirical question:
unfortunately, no agency has reported on any attempt to ascertain,
in controlled circumstances, the differences in attitudes and
predispositions that they arouse among respondents) . On this
assumption, any substantial variation over time in the responses
obtained by DIVO, which performed the surveying for the U .S . High
Commission, and the Institut für Demoskopie would be due to other
factors, such as differences in sampling designs, that would render
their results basically noncomparable.
The longitudinal series of data on party preferences produced by
the two agencies are remarkably similar . To be sure, as both Table 2
and Figure 1 show, there is a difference in the level of response
to the two questions . The share of HICK respondents preferring
the CDU/CSU averaged 37 per cent for the eight quarters years, as
against 40 per cent choosing the Social Democratic party ; the
averages for IfD respondents were, respectively, 32 and 35 per cent.
The more interesting question is whether or not, at the various
points in time, the relationship between the paired responses to the
questions remains stable
. That is, if there is an increase from
one quarter to the next in SPD preferences in one series, is there
a corresponding increase in the other series? The answer is, yes.
For the CDU/CSU, the fit over time between the two sets of responses
was quite close : The Pearsonian product-moment correlation
coefficient, r, is equal to ±0 .87 (on a scale on which ±1 .00
represents a perfect match between two sets of data and 0 .00 a
complete absence of any systematic relationship between them) ; the
relationship is significant at the .001 level, which means that,
out of every thousand similar sets of data, such a relationship
would occur by chance alone no more than once . The fit between
relative levels of support for the Social Democratic party was
slightly less close (r = ±0 .82, p < .01) . The changing ratio of
CDU/CSU to SPD respones, which for the period as a whole averaged
.96 for HICOG and .93 for IfD respondents, was stronger still
(r = ±0 .91, p< .001)
.(31)
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Figure l:	 Comparative Data on Party Preferences, July 1951 to September 1953
Questions
HICOG : "Would you please tell me which party you like best?"
IFD (Allensbach) : "Which party is closest to your viewpoint?"
%	
50
%
50
x
45
40
35
30
25 — . -25
20 — ,20
15 15
Jul-
	
Oct- Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan- Apr Jul-
Sep
	
Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar' .Jun Sep
1951
	
1951 1952 1952 1952 1952 1953 1953 1953
Key : HICOG :CDU x —x —x IfD :CDU 0 -0 — 0
SPD ±—±—+ SPD
	
0 -9 — 9
Other x —x —x Other 0 —o — 0
Sources (for full references, see the footnotes cited below)
HICOG : HICOG,
IfD :
	
Noelle
Series 2, No. 191, December 11, 1953, p
. 1 (fn .19).
and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955, pp . 252-253 (fn .23).
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Small differences in levels of response notwithstanding, the
longitudinal comparison shows that the HICK and IfD surveys were
quite similar in charting the fortunes in the West German public's
eye of at least the two major political parties . This fact suggests,
although it cannot by itself prove, that the sampling designs used
by the two polling agencies were also similar . (The stability of
the relationship between the two sets of data indicates that
differences in levels of response were due to the way in which the
questions were worded, not to the sampling design .) On the
substantive side, it is interesting to note in Figure1 the reversal
in position of the two parties . From mid-1951 through 1952 more
respondents favored the CDU/CSU than the SPD . The switch--which
came in the first quarter of 1953 according to IfD pollsters, and
in the second quarter in the data reported by HICK--led to a
comfortable lead for the Union parties in the summer quarter.
Predicting Electoral Outcomes . Only slightly below the surface of
the discussion to this point is the possibility that the HICOG
data could have been used before the election took place to predict
its outcome . Table 2 even assessed the efforts of various polling
agencies in terms of how close their results were to the actual
vote on election day . That survey data are often used in this way,
and frequently quite successfully so, should not disguise the fact
that social scientists have not yet developed a thoroughly satis-
factory model for predicting electoral outcomes on the basis of
such data .(32) The main problems are gauging the firmness of
respondents' announced intentions to vote in a particular way, and
determining the likely vote of people who cannot or will not tell
interviewers how they intend to vote . The attempt by HICK analysts
to predict how the 1953 Bundestag election would turn out highlights
these problems.
In its survey, conducted for the U .S . High Commission and in the
field during the two weeks before the 1953 Bundestag election, DIVO
included a series of questions designed to permit prediction of
the electoral outcome
.(33) Initial items asked of 663 respondents
found that only 648 were entitled to vote and that, of these, only
562 indicated any intention to cast a ballot (Table 3) . Slightly
over three-quarters of those who expected to vote (431 respondents)
specified the party of their choice . Half of the remaining 131 who
said that they had not yet made up their minds gave responses to
two further questions that indicated their partisan leaning, leaving
only 65 who could not be classified on the basis of their answers.
Moving from such a distribution of responses to predictions requires
several assumptions . First is the assumption, which cannot be dealt
with here, that respondents are honestly reporting their voting
intentions ; this assumption has underlain and been repeatedly
substantiated by four decades of public opinion research
. A second
assumption is that a desire to see a particular party win is as
strong an indicator of future voting behavior as is a declared
intent to vote for that party . More problematic is the question of
how people indicating uncertainty about whether or not they will
vote actually behave on election day . DIVO analysts assumed that
all such persons would not vote . This assumption produced a voter
turnout of 86
.7 per cent--somewhat higher than the actual rate of
83
.2 per cent of eligible voters who turned out at the polls .(34)
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Table 3 : HICOG Data as the Basis for Predicting the 1953 Electoral Outcome
Questions
1. "For which party will you probably cast your vote at the coming elections?"
2. (If no party mentioned) "Would you be more inclined to vote for one of the
parties now in office-CDU, FDP, DP--or more inclined to vote for the SPD?
Or more inclined toward one of the other parties? Which?"
3. (If no party inclination mentioned) "Well, what do you personally desire:
Which party should win--or don't you care at all?"
First
Question
Second
Question
Third
Question
Total Responses
Number
	
Pct.
CDU/CSU 217 15 6 238 36 .7%
FDP, DP, BHE 66 3 -- 69 10 .6
"Coalition -- 23 -- 23 3 .5
(Total Coalition) (283) (41) (6) (330) (50 .9)
SPD 127 12 3 142 21 .9
Other parties 21 3 1 25 3 .9
Subtotal 431 56 10 497 76.7
Do not intend to vote 26 26 4 .0
Uncertain about voting 60 60 9 .3
No opinion 131 75 65 65 10 .0
Subtotal 648 T3T 76 ~4$ 100 .0
Not eligible to vote 15 	 15
Total t;S3 T3T 76 663
Source : Data prepared for HICOG but analyzed in DIVO files ; reported by Herzig,
"Die Befragungen von EMNID and DIVO," pp
. 428-429 (see fn .24).
The critical assumption lies in the treatment of respondents who
report that they intend to vote but, for whatever reason, are
disinclined to divulge their partisan preferences . These respondents
comprise a tenth of all eligible voters
. The analyst who has some
additional information about these respondents, such as the direction
and intensity of their attitudes on some key issues, may make some
shrewd guesses about their voting choices . It may also be possible
to distribute such respondents according to some aggregate
characteristic of the electorate as a whole
. If, for example,
surveys conducted by a particular agency are known to underestimate
persistently the percentage of the population that will vote for
certain unpopular minority parties, it may be reasonable to "assign"
some nominally uncommitted but voting respondents to the ranks of
these parties . Any such adjustments will of course require
justification by the analyst.
In the absence of any additional information about this elusive
tenth of the eligible voters, the analyst has no alternative but
to distribute them in the same proportions in which committed
respondents identify themselves with given parties . Thus if one
out of four voters expressing a partisan preference names a parti-
cular political party, it will be assumed that a fourth of the
uncommitted will also vote for that party .(35) Table 4 applies this
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distributive principle to both the analysis by DIVO of its own
data, outlined above, as well as another analysis reported by the
HICK Evaluation Staff . The latter, in all likelihood using the
same data, has provided no specific discussion about how its
predictions were calculated . (In both cases, respondents who
answered "Coalition" to the second question were assigned
proportionately into the "CDU/CSU" and "FDP, DP, BHE" categories).
It is with a dash of disappointment
	
that we view the results of
these essays in electoral prediction . On the one hand, both analyses
were reasonably close on target . They overestimated somewhat the
support that the Union parties would obtain and underestimated
the strength of the CDU/CSU's coalition partners as well as other
small parties : and the average difference between their estimates
is as low as t 0 .7 percentage points . But, on the other hand, the
predictions are not noticeably better than those produced by far
simpler questions reported in Table 2 . In fact, using only the
first question listed in Table 3 (reported in Table 2 as "HICOG-II"")
yielded a better prediction overall than did the DIVO analysts'
use of all three questions in the same table (with average
differences from the actual vote-of ± 2 .9 and ± 3 .2 percentage
points, respectively) . And neither the DIVO nor the HICK analysis
approached the accuracy of a question asked in the UNESCO survey,
"If the Bundestag election were to be held tomorrow, for which
party would you vote?"
Table 4 : Accuracy of DIVO and HICOG Predictions
DIVO Analysis HICOG Analysis
Vote
Predicted
Vote
Diff. from
Actual Vote
Predicted
Vote
Diff. from
Actual Vote
45 .2% 51 .5% ±6 .3 50 .1% ±4.9
18 .6 14 .9 -3 .7 15 .3 -3 .3
(63 .8) (66.4) (±2 .6) (65.4) (±1 .6)
28 .8 28 .6 -0 .2 28.8 -0 .0
7 .4 5 .0 -2 .4 5 .8 -1 .6
100 .0% 100.0% ± 3.2 100.0% ±2.4Total
Source : Herzig, "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO", pp . 429-430 (see fn .24),
and HICOG, Series 2, No . 191, December 11, 1953, p . 2 (see fn .19).
Responses specifying solely the "Coalition" have been divided
proportionately into the first two categories ("CDU/CSU" and "FDP, DP,
BHE").
That a more extensive battery of questions designed to force
respondents into committing themselves to a partisan position did
not markedly improve the predictive quality of the HICOG data points
less to weaknesses in the data themselves than in the predictive
model that interpreted them . In the years since then public opinion
analysts have greatly refined their predictive models .(36) Other
approaches seek to use more indirect methods to ascertain the
probable voting behavior of those reluctant to express their
CDU/CSU
FDP, DP, BHE
(Coalition
SPD
Other parties
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preferences and verify that of announced partisans . Even so, an
empirically valid theory of electoral prediction remains to be
developed.
Comparisons of Population Groups . A final test of the HICK data's
validity rests on comparable studies showing how groupings within
the West German population vote . Do simultaneous, independently
drawn samplings suggest a common behavioral pattern for men? How
about young people, or workers, or those with advanced education?
Unfortunately, available studies for comparison with the HICK
surveys are not ideal for answering such questions completely.
There are nonetheless two studies that can provide an approximate
comparison : the EMNID pollings of July and August, 1953, and a
representative sampling by the Federal Statistical Office of
voters at the polling booths . All three sets of data provide some
information on the voting intentions or behavior of subgroups
within the West German population.
The three studies are different in several respects, not the least
important of which is the time at which they were conducted
. The
EMNID surveys, as we have already seen, sought to find out before
the election how people intended to vote . Of relevance here is its
series of three surveys carried out in the weeks of July 3-10,
August 11-16, and August 20-28, each with a sample of approximately
2 .000 respondents . The key question asked, "If the next Bundestag
election were to take place now, would you vote? For which party
would you vote?" For the present purpose the three EMNID surveys
have been treated as one, with a sample of about 6 .000 West
Germans .(37) Nor is there anything remarkable about the two post-
election surveys conducted by DIVO in behalf of the U .S . High
Commission, which were in the field from September 14 to September
27 (interviewing 1 .270 respondents) and from October 22 to November
2 (with 904 respondents) . Since each asked the same question--
"Would you please tell me for the candidate of which party you
voted?" --HICOG analysts combined into a single table the responses
to both .(38) Supplementary tables in their report show how various
subgroups in the West German population answered the question.
The Federal Statistical Office's representative statistics are
derived not from responses to questions posed by interviewers
employed by commercial agencies, but rather from data gathered by
election officials from the voter who is casting a ballot.(39)
Before the election the Statistical Office, using a stratified
random procedure, selected a sample of 513 electoral districts,
representative of the entire Federal Republic and including 1 .5
per cent of all eligible voters . As it turned out, the survey could
not be conducted in either Bavaria or the Rhineland Palatinate.
The final sample, then, contained 370 .543 eligible voters (1 .5 per
cent of those in the 369 districts included), of whom 319 .818 voted.
Each of the latter was given a special ballot, different from what
other West German voters got only in that it contained spaces in
which those voting were to indicate both their sex and the age
category to which they belonged . Such information, federal officials
feel, does not violate the principle of the secret ballot . And the
assistance that it gives to government officials, scholars, and
others who wish to understand German voting behavior justifies
the small added cost of printing and counting the special
ballots .(40)
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Table 5 : Basis for Comparing HICOG, Federal Statistical Office, and EMNID Data
CDU/
CSU
FDP
BHE
Total
Coali-
tion1 SPD
Other
Par-
ties
Total
or
Average1
Actual Election Results
September 6 45.2% 15 .4% (60
.6%) 28.8% 10 .6% 100 .0%
HICOG Survey
Sept 14-Nov 2 54.0% 13 .5% (67 .5%) 26.1% 6 .4% 100 .0%
HICOG-Results ±8.8 -1 .9 (±6 .9)
-2.7 -4 .2 t 4 .4
Representative Statistics (excludes Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate)
Official Results 2 43.9% 15 .8% (59
.7%) 30 .3% 10 .0% 100 .0%
Rep . Stat .
	
(Sep 6) 43 .3% 17 .0% (60 .3%) 29 .9% 9.8% 100 .0%
Rep . Stat.-Results -0 .6 ±1 .2 (+0 .6) -0 .4 -0 .2 ±0.6
HICOG - Rep . Stat . ±10 .7 -3 .5 (±7 .2) -3 .8 -3 .4 ±5.4
EMNID Survey
Jul 3-Aug 28 39 .8% 21 .5% (61 .3%) 26 .1% 12 .6% 100 .0%
HICOG - EMNID ±14 .2 -8.0 (±6 .2) ±0.0 -6 .2 17 .1
' Total or average calculations do not include figures for the "Total Coalition"
category . Nonvoters and respondents naming no party are excluded from the
table.
2The "Official Results" reported in this line are the same as the "Actual
Election Results" reported above, except that the former adjust the latter
to exclude votes cast in Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate, where the
representative statistics survey was not carried through.
Sources (for full references, see the footnotes cited below)
Actual Results : Horstmann, "Die Wahl", p . 389 (see Table 1).
HICOG: HICOG, Series 2, No . 191, December 11, 1953, p . 3 (fn .19).
Rep. Stat . : Horstmann, "Wahlbeteiligung", p
. 10 (fn 39).
EMNID : Herzig ; "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO", pp . 426-427 (fn .24).
The problems of comparative analysis of such sets of data cannot
be ignored
. There are, first of all, the issues discussed earlier,
including variations due to the phrasing of questions, selection
of samples, interviewing, procedures, and other aspects of the
surveying process . The failure of Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate
to carry out the survey designed to obtain representative statistics
adds another small bias . As Table 5 shows, the "official results"
against which the representative statistics are compared vary
somewhat (an average of t 1 .0 percentage points for the four vote
categories included in the table) from the actual : vote totals
since the former figures must exclude votes cast in the two states.
Any comparison of the HICOG's survey results with the representative
statistics must take into account the possibility of this one per
cent error.
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Second, the timing of the surveys makes a difference
. EMNID
performed its fieldwork at a time when many voters were doubtless
making up their minds and others were reluctant to commit themselves
publicly to a choice among the parties
. The Federal Statistical
Office had direct access to the ballots of individuals on the day
they voted . This fact, besides enabling federal officials to know
how people actually voted rather than how they said they were
planning to vote, eliminated the category of respondents who were
either undecided or unwilling to state their preferences . These
people simply did not show up at the polls . (As Table 5 shows, the
average difference between the tallies recorded by the Federal
Statistical Office and the final vote for the corresponding
electoral districts covered in the Statistical Office's survey
was ± 0
.6 percentage points for the four vote categories) . The
HICOG survey, by contrast, was conducted well after the election
itself . Questions asked retrospectively to determine how a population
voted almost always encounter distortion, whether deliberate or
not
. A larger percentage than actually voted for the winning party
usually recalls having done so, and the reverse is true vis-a-vis
the losing party . In this case there was a surplus of +8
.8 percentage
points for the victorious CDU/CSU and a deficit of -2
.7 percentage
points for the defeated SPD
. The passage of time also seems to
enhance the operation of the phenomenon mentioned earlier of
suppressed support in face-to-face interviews for minor and perhaps
unpopular parties
. In the HICOG's post-election survey, only 6 .4
per cent of the respondents who said how they voted could recall
having voted for one of the minor parties, whereas 10 .6 per cent
of the actual vote was cast for these parties . How can we take into
account variations probably due to differences in timing? As in
the earlier discussion on changing views over time, comparisons
of questions from before and after the 1953 election must be viewed
in terms not of differences of level in the responses, but rather
variability under ceteris paribus conditions, that is, when
differences of level are held constant
. The means to do this will
be discussed later.
Third, since available data for the three surveys are fragmentary,
mostly in the form of either percentage distributions or simple
cross-tabulations of data, it is not always possible to mesh social
groupings as defined by the surveying agencies . The representative
statistics, for example, present breakdowns of voters' ages in three
categories (under 30, 30-60, and 60 and over) while the HICOG
surveys use six (21-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over).
Reconciling such differing operational procedures by distinct
agencies requires some assumptions about the nature of the data.
To separate most simply the category of respondents aged 25 to 34
in the HICOG surveys into sets of respondents under and above the
age of 30, the cutting point for the Federal Statistical Office,
it is necessary to assume that the number of respondents between
the ages of 25 and 29 roughly equals the number aged 30 to 34(41),
and that the political attitudes (or at least voting dispositions)
of the two age categories are roughly similar . As will be seen,
the problems caused by varying definitions of occupational cate-
gories in the EMNID and HICOG surveys are thornier still.
A final and less troublesome problem deserves attention because it
makes the material discussed in this section a bit less comparable
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with what went before
. Earlier tabulations of the category of votes
for the coalition included the German party (DP) as well as the
Christian Union parties (CDU/CSU), Free Democrats (FDP), and
Refugee party (BHE) . Available analyses of the EMNID surveys and
federal representative statistics do not give separate data for
the German party, even though it got 3 .2 per cent of the vote in
the 1953 election
. Tables 5 and 6, and the discussion based on
them, likewise consider the DP a part of the "other parties"
category of votes
. Internal consistency within this section, however,
does not obviate interpretive problems that would arise if, let
us say, figures from Table 6 were to be contrasted with those from
Table 4.
The procedure used to examine differences between the HICOG surveys
on the one hand and, on the other, the representative statistics
and EMNID surveys will be similar to that followed earlier in
assessing the similarity of longitudinal data . Since it seems
reasonable to expect that the timing of the three surveys will by
itself and in conjunction with other factors produce a systematic
bias in the level of responses, in what follows it will be necessary
to neutralize this element
. One way to do this is to look not
at the absolute level of responses but at their deviation from the
responses that we might expect in the knowledge of how much bias
is in the data
. In slightly more technical language, we want to
control for known bias as a means to check the stability of the
responses otherwise.
As a baseline for the expected amount of bias we shall use for each
paired set of data (HICOG vs
. representative statistics, and HICOG
vs . EMNID) the overall difference between them in each category
of votes (CDU/CSU, FDP/BHE, SPD and other parties) . Table 5 shows
that the representative statistics recorded in the voting districts
sampled that 45 .3 per cent of the ballots were cast for the CDU/CSU.
HICOG surveys several weeks later found 54
.0 per cent of their
sample who expressed themselves recalling that they had voted for
the CDU/CSU
. The difference between these two figures (54 .0% -
45 .3% = +10
.7 percentage points) maybe taken as the amount of bias
normally to be expected from differences in the two studies . In
like fashion, we might normally expect that the HICOG report on
recalled votes for the Social Democratic party would be 3 .8
percentage points less than the estimate based on the representative
statistics (26
.1% - 29 .9% = -3 .8 percentage points).
These baseline figures of expected variation can then be compared
against the actual amount by which some grouping in the population,
such as women or people under the age of 30, differs in the two
surveys vis-a-vis a given party . If the representative statistics
show that 47 .2 per cent of West German women voted for the CDU/CSU;
then we would expect that, in the later HICOG survey, the share
of women recalling that they voted for the Union parties would
be 10 .7 percentage points greater, or 57
.9 per cent .(42) In fact,
though, 59
.3 per cent of the women responding to HICOG interviewers
claimed this
. The deviation from the norm in this case is +1 .4
percentage points . By way of interpretation, we might say that,
taking into account biases introduced by the circumstances of the
surveys, the share of women who remembered voting for the CDU/CSU
was 1 .4 percentage points greater than we would have expected on
the basis of the representative statistics .
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Table 6: Variations Among Population Subgroups in Reported Votes1
Other
	
Aver-
SPD
	
Parties	 age 2
HICOG Survey Results vs .
Expected variation
(HICOG - Rep. Stat .)
Deviation from expected
Men
Women
Average
Deviation from expected
Under 30
30-60
60 and older
Average
Average deviation
(HICOG - Rep. Stat .)
CDU/
	
FDP
	
Total
CSU
	
BHE
	
Coalition 2
Representative Statistics
	
+10 .7
	
-3 .5
	
(+7 .2)
variation, by Sex
	
-0.3	 ±0.0	 (-0 .3)
	
+0 .8
	
-0 .5	 ±0.4
	
+1 .4
	
-0-.6
	
(+0 .8)
	
-0 .3
	
-0 .5
	 ±0.7
	
10 .9
	
!0 	 (0.6)	 10 .6
	
TU75
	
10 .6
variation, by Age
	
-2 .9
	
+3 .2 (+0 .3)
	
-1 .9
	
+1 .6
	
'12 .4
	
+0 .9
	
-1 .9
	
(-1 .0)
	
+1 .5
	
-0 .4
	
11 .2
	
+3.6
	
+1 .9
	
(+5 .5)
	
-4 .5
	
-0 .9
	
12 .7
	
12 .5
	
12.3
	
(t2 .3)
	
7:
	
!
	
T'2-7f
-3 .8
	
-3 .4 '
	
15 .4
11 .8
	
11 .5
	
(±1 .6) 11 .8
	
10 .8
	
11 .5
HICOG Survey Results vs . EMNID
Expected variation
(HICOG - EMNID)
Survey Results
+14.2
	
-8 .0
	
(+6 .2)
	
10 .0
	
-6 .2
	
17 .1
Average
Deviation from expected variation, by Education
Elem. school only
	
-0 .9
	
+3.6
	
(+2 .7)
	
-4 .3
	
+1 .7
	
12 .6
More than elem . school
	
+4.3
	
-3 .7
	
(+0 .6)
	
-1 .8
	
+1 .1
	
-2.7
Average
	
12 .6
	
177T
	
(±1 .7)
	
13 .6 !4
	
±777
Deviation from expected variation, by Religion
Protestant
	
-0.1
	
-1 .4- 1=TM)
	
-0 .1
	
+1 .6
	
±0 .8
Catholic
	
+0.3
	
+2 .1
	
(+2 .4)
	
-4 .2
	
+1 .8
	
±2 .1
All religions
	
+0.8
	
+0 .5
	
(+1 .3)
	
-2 .1
	
+0 .8
	
11 .1
Average
	
X0:4
	
rr:S (11 .7)
	
!27f ?r4
	
E
Deviation from expected variation, by Occupation
Workers
	
+0 .1
	
+3 .9
	
(+4 .0)
	
-6 .5
	
+2 .4
	
±3 .2
	
Employees (whitecollar) -2 .5
	
-4 .9
	
(-7 .4)
	
+6 .6
	
+0 .9
	
13 .7
Farmers, farm workers
	
-0.5
	
+4.2
	
(+3 .7)
	
-8 .3
	
+4 .8
	
14 .5
Prof., self-employed
	
+9.9
	
-12 .9
	
(-3 .0)
	
-1 .7
	
+4 .7
	
+ 7 .3
Other, retired, etc .
	
-6 .6
	
+5 .3
	
(-1 .3)
	
-0 .6
	
+1 .9
	
13 .6
	
+ 3 .9
	
16 .2
	
(±3 .9)
	
~ t2.3
	
!43
Average deviation
(HICOG -EMNID)
	
12 .6
	
±4 .3
	
(±5 .4)
	
13 .6
	
12 .2
	
13 .2
OverallDeviation from Expected Variation
12 .3
	
13 .4
	
(±4 .1)
	
±3 .0
	
11 .7
	
12 .6
category.
1See the text for an explanation of how the scores for "deviation from expected
2variation" were obtained.
Total or average calculations do not include figures for the "Total Coalition"
Source: See Tables- 1 and 5, and footnotes 19, 24, and 39 .
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Table 6 shows a range of indicators of unanticipated variance (as
we shall term deviation from expected variations) for the West
German population . In two cases, in which-the entire sample is
divided into subsamples based on sex and age, HICOG findings are
contrasted with those of the Federal Statistical Office's represen-
tative statistics . The remaining three cases show the amount of
unanticipated variance between HICOG and EMNID surveys when the
entire sample is broken up according to the respondents' (dichotomous)
level of education, religion, and occupation . With one exception,
the average amounts of unanticipated variance are well within the
normally accepted limits of sampling error.
The exception comprises comparisons of the HICOG and EMNID surveys
of occupational subgroups . The reason for this doubtless lies in
the agencies' nonequivalent definitions of occupations, which in
turn produced categories of unequal size in the two samples . The
HICOG survey classifies 13 .6 per cent of its respondents (excluding
housewives) as "whitecollar workers", whereas 14 per cent of the
EMNID sample are listed as employees and an additional four per
cent as civil servants and employees in government offices . The
extent to which the categories are congruent cannot be determined
on the basis of available information . It seems likely, for instance,
that some in EMNID's groupings might have been in the HICOG's
category of semi-skilled workers . Similarly, EMNID put housewives in-
totheoccupational category of the head of the household, HICOG into
a separate category altogether (not included in Table 6) . The
occupational classifications shown in Table 6, then, are only
roughly equivalent for the two surveys, and render very tentative
conclusions based on the groups thus classified.
The main import of the data shown in Table 6 is that, once we
account for the main source of variation, the different surveys
produce remarkably similar results . This remains true despite the
need for caution imposed by the numerous potential sources of error
noted earlier . In fact, the conclusion may even be conservative,
since most of these sources of error, if they played a role at all,
should have exacerbated variance from expected findings . The
strategy followed in this section is more generally a harsh test
of the validity of the HICOG data . A basic principle of sampling
theory is that smaller samples produce greater variation in results,
all other things being equal, than do larger samples . With the one
major exception discussed in the last paragraph, breaking down the
entire West German sample into subsamples based on several demo-
graphic criteria did not produce dramatic discrepancies between
HICOG data and either the Federal Statistical Office's represen-
tative statistics or another sample survey conducted by a competing
polling agency . Finding stable relationships where instability
seems more likely enhances our sense that the HICOG data accurately.
tapped important dimensions of West German political attitudes.
Validity of the HICOG Data . Given limitations on the data available
for reanalysis of the HICOG's 1953 election study, there is no way
directly to validate its findings . We cannot return to the
respondents interviewed for it, to check the responses or obtain
additional information, nor, as we have seen, can we rely completely
on the predictive power of any survey, especially the earlier ones,
as a test of its validity . The procedure followed here was indirect
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validation . Much as geologists test theories about the nature of
the earth's interior at whatever outcroppings they can find, our
procedure compared elements of the HICOG study that intersected
with data from other empirical studies of the 1953 federal election
in West Germany . Such comparisons are hampered severely, however,
by imprecision and nonequivalencies in the instruments used by
various agencies to investigate German electoral behavior.
The streams of evidence reviewed here consistently support the
proposition that the surveys conducted for the HICOG's 1953 election
study accurately mirrored public attitudes at the time . Several
kinds of comparison with data from other surveys reveal no need
for defensiveness on the part of HICOG professionals responsible
for the High Commission's survey research . The results of their
pre-election survey even closely approximated the actual outcome
of the election . Moreover, once differences due primarily to its
timing had been controlled for, the HICOG post-election survey
proved to be extremely close (average unanticipated variance =  ± 1 .5
percentage points) to results, broken down by the sex and age of
the respondents of the government's official statistics, based
on the ballots of a representative sample of almost 320 .000 West
German voters . The conclusion seems inescapable that the surveys
conducted for the HICOG election study were valid, that is, they
in fact indicated about West German thinking on the election what
those who had developed and used the surveys said they did.
Returning to a concern expressed early in the paper, we may
reasonably be optimistic, if its 1953 election study can serve as
an indicator, about the more general value of HICOG's public
opinion surveys for understanding West German political attitudes.
Their findings about the public's view on rearmament, the East-
West conflict, European integration, reunification, and other
issues may be taken at face value as indications of what the mass
public was actually thinking . But such a statement lends itself
easily to misunderstanding . There is a basic difference between
an election study and public opinion on other vital topics . Most
public opinion analysis rests on the electoral principle of "one
man, one vote" . That is, responses to questions are tallied,
percentages of yeas and nays are reported, and the data are
intercorrelated to test some more subtle notions . In the case of
an election, majority opinion on one side, behind one party, wins
the day for that party . Majority opinion on one side of a public
issue not subject to a referendum, however, may easily be outweighed
by the views of an articulate minority--and even, as Chancellor
Adenauer showed time and again, by the strong feelings of a single
man in a position of power . Public opinion is one desideratum, but
only one, in the process by which governments make policy . To
recognize the value of public opinion analysis for understanding
policy and the policymaking process is not to mistake it as the
sole dimension of these phenomena . Properly understood, the wide
range of public opinion data collected and analyzed by the U .S.
High Commission constitutes an important contribution to scholarship
on the political development of postwar West Germany .
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TOWARD RESOLVING CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION
The data contained in the HICOG's 1953 election study, however brief
a document it may be, can also make a concrete contribution to under-
standing both the election itself and West German electoral behavior.
For one thing, it should be abundantly clear by now that the magnitude
of the CDU/CSU's victory could have come as no surprise to anyone
familiar with the HICOG or other pre-election surveys . Polls
throughout the two months before the election revealed that the
parties most likely to join in a coalition government under Adenauer
would receive an overwhelming majority of the votes, and that the
CDU/CSU by itself would outpoll the Social Democratic party by
somewhere between a quarter and a third of the latter's votes . And,
on the day before the election, HICOG analysts circulated a report
predicting both that the CDU/CSU alone would get 46 .0 per cent of
the vote (it got 45 .2 per cent) and that the coalition governing
the First Bundestag, that is, the CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP, would
obtain 60 .9 per cent (somewhat above its actual total of 57 .9 per
cent) .(43) If observers of the West German political scene were
in fact surprised by the electoral outcome, then it was because
they either had no knowledge of the polls or did not put much stock
in the accuracy of poll results.
A second interpretation, that the election demonstrated the secure
foundations of West German democracy, turns out upon analysis to
be more rhetoric than anything else . It was of course not uncontested.
Some pointed out that one supposed proof of the new attitude, a high
turnout of voters, was a characteristic of pre-1933 German elections
as well, including some in which anticonstitutional parties such as
the Nazis and KPD enjoyed striking success . High rates of participation
may be more a function of the voters' interest in the campaign (in
which case, the more hotly contested the election, the higher is the
turnout) than their desire to demonstrate loyalty to a political
system . Others noted that the second proof was equally ambiguous:
The 1953 election, they said, could not have served as a genuine
test of the population's democratic sentiments since only parties
committed to the maintenance of the constitutional order could take
part .(44) The neo-Nazi Socialist Reich party, for instance, had
already been banned by the Federal Constitutional Court ; and
officials of the Justice Ministry had already initiated proceedings
that in 1956 would dissolve the Communist party as well . More to the
point is the fact that West Germans had enjoyed ample opportunity
during the preceding four years to demonstrate any basic antagonism
toward the political system established under the Federal Republic.
Few had chosen to do so .
	
'
Although the HICOG's 1953 election study does not deal directly , with
the question of whether or not West Germans enjoyed a solid sense
of democracy, its other studies provide a wealth of relevant data.
These data, along with findings reported by other polling agencies,
showed that the mass of the population had accepted the principles
and practices of 'democracy long before the 1953 election .(45) This
is not to say that all antidemocratic sentiments had disappeared.
This was not the case, nor is it for any other nation. Rather, in
the early 1950s West Germans were increasingly satisfied with their
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government, with the progress that it was making in reconstructing
the German economy and regaining a measure of international
recognition for their country . The continuing series of HICOG
studies, in chronicling this development, suggests that the election
was merely another marker in the path toward democracy and complete
sovereignty .(46)
A third interpretation saw nothing remarkable in the 1953 Bundestag
election, but rather people behaving much as they do in other
industrial democracies when choosing among parties and candidates.
The question shifts, then, from a societal to an individual level,
from a concern with what the election meant for Germany as a whole
to an interest in why people voted as they did . This paper outlined
earlier five possible sources of West German electoral behavior (as
well as that in similar countries) : political issues, party
identification, the candidates' personalities, special political
circumstances, and the sociological characteristics of the voters.
Here we can only summarize those main findings of the HICOG's 1953
election study which have a direct bearing on such explanations of
voting behavior . A full analysis must be left for later.
Political issues in any specific sense were not overwhelmingly
salient in the voters' responses to questions about their reasons
for voting as they had . CDU/CSU voters stressed general feelings
about the way things were going : Adenauer's personality and prestige
in the world (mentioned by 30 per cent), religious reasons (21%),
the economic gains of the years previous (19%), and satisfaction
with the achievements of the CDU (17%), or simply their belief that
the CDU/CSU "is the best party" (9%) . Those who said that they had
voted for the SPD were only slightly more oriented to specific
issues . The top three reasons volunteered to explain why they had
cast ballots for the Social Democrats were their belief that the
SPD advocates the cause of the workers (69%), economic and social
gains that could be expected from an SPD government (9%), and only
in third place (with 7 per cent) the issues named by most observers
as having been the key factors in the election--SPD opposition to
German remilitarization and the European Defense Community (killed
during the following summer by the French parliament, and ultimately
replaced by a plan providing for West German membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) . As Table 7 shows, even if they were
given a list of possible reasons for voting and asked to say which
of them weighed heaviest in their own minds, HICOG respondents
shied away from responses oriented to issues .(47) A question asking
why the CDU/CSU had done as well as it did in the election brought
similar expressions . The three most frequently cited reasons were
Adenauer's personality and achievements (29 per cent of all voters,
31 per cent of those who had voted for the CDU/CSU, and 27 per cent
of those who had not), the Christian, that is, Catholic character
of the party (21%), and its success in reviving the German economy
(16%).
Nor did many German voters worry about the special political
circumstances that were said to have favored the Christian Union
parties . Only six per cent of all voters attributed the party's
success to its more effective election campaign, and only four
per cent cited poor propaganda as a cause of the SPD's relatively
poor showing . Asked whether or not they had anything to criticize
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Table 7 : Reasons given for Voting for a Particular Party
Question : "There are, of course, various reasons which cause one to vote
for a party, but in most cases one reason is more important than
another . Can you tell me now which of these reasons was the most
important one for your voting for the (CDU or SPD)? And what would
be in second place? And what in third place? "
First
Place
Second
Place
Third
Place
Reasons for Voting for the CDU
The CDU is a Christian party 40% 7% 6%
Adenauer has acquired respect, friends, and prestige
for Germany throughout the world 18 24 17
Adenauer is a great leader 16 20 11
The CDU led us to prosperity and economic recovery 11 17 18
The CDU best advocates German reunification 7 15 12
The CDU had the most capable candidate in my
constituency 2 2 4
The CDU is for our military participation in the EDC
--the European Defense Community 1 4 4
The CDU is for a political union of West Europe * 4 10
The CDU had the best solutions for important issues
in my constituency - * 4
My most important reason for voting for the CDU is
none of the above reasons, but . . . (supplied by
respondent) 3 1 2
No opinion 2 6 12
Total 100% 100% 100%
Reasons for Voting for the SPD
The SPD has always been the workers' party 57% 14% 5%
The SPD is against our military participation in the
EDC--the European Defense Community 14 21 11
The SPD has the best economic and social programs 11 11 16
The SPD is independent of church influence 6 22 11
Because I'm dissatisfied with my economic
circumstances 3 5 8
The SPD best advocates German reunification 2 8 9
Because I'm dissatisfied with Adenauer and the
Federal government 1 '6 8
The SPD had the most capable candidate in my
constituency
* *
4
The SPD had the best solutions for important issues
in my constituency * - 3
011enhauer is a great leader * 2
My most important reason for voting for the SPD is
none of the above reasons, but . . . (supplied
	
by
respondent) 3 2 3
No opinion 3 11 20
Total 100% 100% 100%
*Less than one-half of one per cent.
Source : HICOG, Series No . 2, Report No . 191, December 11, 1953, pp . 17, 19.
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about the parties' campaigns, two-thirds (66%) responded
negatively and a quarter (24%) offered criticisms . Half of the
latter group complained in general about the mudslinging campaign
tactics (7%) or the waste of money in campaigning (5%), but many
of the remaining respondents focused more narrowly on the propa-
ganda of one party or the other . The charges were directed in roughly
equal proportions to the two major parties.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's pre-election remarks, which
were widely interpreted as an overt indication of American backing
for Chancellor Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, seemed to have had some but
not an overwhelming effect on German voters : Whereas in July only
one in six (16%) felt that the United States supported the CDU/CSU,
the post-election survey in September found that 28 per cent held
this view
. Among the electorate as a whole, 40 per cent felt that
America did not support any particular party
. Almost a third (30%)
of CDU/CSU voters thought that their party had received American
support, and five of six of these respondents approved the American
behavior
. Of the 45 per cent of SPD voters who saw their rivals
receiving such support, two in nine (10%) approved of it anyway
and three times that number (30%) disapproved . No one among the
1
.270 respondents in the nationwide poll seems to have responded
to an open-ended question about the reason for the CDU/CSU's
success with the charge that it was due to American intervention.
In short, although there was consensus among experts at the time
and later historians of the period that the CDU/CSU ran a more
"modern" political campaign and that the United States had inter-
vened rather directly to encourage support for the party, and
although Social Democratic leaders at the time complained loudly
that both circumstances were working to the SPD's disadvantage,
the popular perception was considerably less clearcut . Only small
minorities felt that the CDU/CSU's putative advantages paid off
in terms of votes, and a minority even among the Social Democratic
supporters objected to what they thought they saw . This is not to
say that these circumstances did not help the Christian Union parties.
Indeed, the fact that their presence was not commonly recognized
may have enhanced their effectiveness in winning votes for the
CDU/CSU . The point here is that there was no strong popular
perception of any special political circumstances that worked to
the advantage of Chancellor Adenauer and his party.
Looking at voters in different social groupings, we find that the
CDU/CSU emerged from the election with a nearly clean sweep . HICOG
analysts divided respondents into 33 categories according to sex,
level of education, age, income, occupation, origin (natives vs.
expellees or refugees from the East), and religion . In only four
of these--two of them (19 people professing a religion other than
Protestantism or Catholicism, and 41 professing no religion at all)
comprising too few respondents for the results to be considered
statistically significant--did the number of SPD voters outweigh
those who reported having voted for the CDU/CSU . The two clearly
deviant categories were semi-skilled laborers (34 per cent for the
CDU/CSU, 37 per cent for the SPD) and skilled laborers (35 and 36
per cent, respectively) . To discuss the sociological correlates
of voting behavior, then, means to focus attention primarily on
differences in the degree to which groupings supported the Union
parties rather than the Social Democrats .
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Those most likely to support the SPD were semi-skilled and skilled
workers, lower-middle income groups, people aged 35 to 54 years,
Protestants, those with only an elementary school education, and
men . Unfortunately, the HICOG report does not provide us with
additional data, such as cross-tabulations, that would enable us
to carry this sociological analysis further . To do that we must
turn to Juan Linz's reanalysis of the study performed in July and
August 1953 by DIVO for the UNESCO Institute for Social Research .(48)
The UNESCO data reinforced the essentially impressionistic judgment
based on the HICOG study that social class and religion are the
most critical variables accounting for voting behavior . Workers
tended to support the SPD, and so did Protestants, particularly if
they were not too active in the church . Protestant workers who went
to church regularly were more likely than other Protestant workers
to vote for the CDU/CSU . Likewise, Catholic workers, subject to
cross-pressures because of their membership in social groups with
opposing political tendencies, would in all likelihood follow the
path indicated by their church affiliation if they went to Mass
fairly frequently, but vote for the SPD if they were estranged from
the church . These relationships remained fairly stable through
at least the early 1960s .(49) In the parliamentary elections since
1969, however, the religious element has been disappearing as
a correlate of voting behavior .(50)
The most difficult of the five "explanatory" variables to discuss
in the framework of the HICOG's 1953 election study is party
identification . Data noted above suggest a hard core of adherents
of each major party, but how large or solid these groups were is
impossible to determine . In effect, the HICOG study used as its
sole indicator of party identification a question about how
respondents had voted on September 6--a problematic procedure, as
we have seen since misremembered votes or nonresponsiveness skewed
the overall distribution of responses in the direction of the most
successful party . Whether or not those identified as "CDU/CSU voters"
had enjoyed a longtime commitment to that party (or its predecessor,
the Center party of Weimar Germany) or were voting for it as a
protest against the leadership of the party to which their hearts
really belonged cannot be determined . This problem is not unique
to the HICOG study . German electoral analysts are continuing to
debate the existence in the Federal Republic of a party identifi-
cation equivalent to that found by students of United States
elections .(51)
The scholarly value of the HICOG study, then, depends upon the
uses to which scholars want to put it . On the one hand, as this
paper has sought to demonstrate, it is a valid reflection of the
state of West German public opinion in the late summer of 1953.
The survey conducted in the two weeks immediately before the
election even formed the basis for a reasonably accurate prediction
of how that election would turn out . Historians interested in the
political development of the Federal Republic in the early 1950s
will find it and other surveys conducted by the High Commission an
important source of information.
For theorists of electoral behavior, on the other hand, the study
leaves much to be desired . The main reason for this is doubtless
the fact that HICOC analysts were interested in the practical
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uses of the surveys--to develop information and predictions that
could be used for planning United States policy--and only marginally
in developing and testing theory about society and individual
behavior .(52) The questions asked in the various surveys that
comprised the HICOG's 1953 election study did not reflect the
latest theoretic developments, as carried on, for instance, at
the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan . Nor did
the way in which the data were presented render the study of great
use for those interested in expanding a systematic framework for
understanding how people vote and why . Even so the social scientist
oriented toward theory will find in the study data and ideas that
say something about the extent to which certain lines of questioning
and techniques for conducting surveys are useful cross-nationally.
For the period of the early 1950s, when data were scarce and the
possibilities for organizing electoral studies in countries other
than the United States were just as rare HICOG's 1953 election
study stands as a milestone . Moreover, by extending our confidence
in the validity of the election study to other surveys conducted
for the United States High Commission in Germany, it opens up new
vistas for students of modern social and political history . This
may be the greatest contribution of the 1953 election study.
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Average
_3 55 { 1
	
9 ±3 .0 ±1 .3 2 4
A rapid comparison of the figures presented above with those
in Table 6 shows some differences, most of them insignificant
in magnitude . The multiplicative procedure in general supports
the conclusions reached in the text.
43. HICOG series No . 2, Report No . 191, p . 2, notes that the
predictions were presented on the afternoon of September 5
(the day before the election) to the director of the Office
of Public Affairs . A visiting American scholar, Daniel S.
McHargue, reports that he was shown these predictions later in
the same day . (see his "Note on Public Opinion Polls", in
German Democracy at Work, ed .Pollock, pp . 176-178) . Given the
closeness of Secretary Dulles's relations with Adenauer, it is
reasonable to assume that basic information about the election's
probable outcome was communicated to the Chancellor (no doubt
merely confirming what he was hearing from the Institutfü
Demoskopie, under contract during the election to the CDU/CSU).
It is in any event difficult to credit Adenauer's statement
(as reported by Daniel, "Adenauer Victory", p . 2) that he was
"astonished" by the size of his party's victory--unless the
time frame he had in mind encompassed the period after mid-
1951, when his popularity and that of the CDU/CSU were at a
very low point (see Figure 1 ; and Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch
1947-1955, pp . 172-173).
44. Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, "Zusammenfassende Bemerkungen", in
Wähler und Gewählte ed . Hirsch-Weber and Schütz et al ., pp.
408-409 . He also notes that the parties in power during the
First Bundestag had changed the electoral law to make it more
difficult for small parties to secure representation (and, more
generally, to discourage them from participation in parliamentary
elections).
45. These findings are reported in extenso in Merritt and Merritt,
Public O p inion inSemisoverein German ; Noelle and Neumann,
Jahrbuch	 1947-1955; and more specifically, Richard L . Merritt,
"Digesting the Past : Views of National Socialism in Semi-
sovereign Germany" , Societas, 7 :2 (Spring 1977), 93-120.
46. In September 1953, 44 per cent of the HICOG sample expressed
their opinion that democracy inWest Germany had grown stronger
during the preceding years (5 per cent thought it weaker);
half (50%) believed that Germans could govern themselves
democratically, as against 15 per cent who thought not . HICOG
Series No . 2, Report No
. 191, p . 47.
- 38 -
47. HICOG analysts even expressed concern on one point : that as
many as 77 per cent of the sample claimed no knowledge of the
platform of the extreme rightwing German Reich party (DRP).
48. Juan J
. Linz Storch de Gracia, "The Social Bases of West
German Politics", Ph
. D . thesis, Columbia University, 1960.
49. Erhard Blankenburg, Kirchliche Bindung undWahlverhalten
Die sozialen Faktoren bei der Wahlentscheidung Nordrhein
Westfalen	 1961 bis 1966 (Olten and Freiburg im Breisgau:
Walter -Verlag, 1967).
50. Werner Kaltefleiter, Zwischen Konsens und Krise : Eine Analyse
der Bundestagswahl 1972 (Cologne : Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1973),
writing after the 1972 election, termed the diminishing
importance of religion in voting decisions a part of West
Germany's trend toward modernity.
51. Max Kaase, "Party Identification in West Germany", inParty
Identification and Beyond, ed
. Ian Budge, IvorCrewe,and
o n Fairlie New York:	 John Wiley & Sons, Inc ., 1976).
52. This was particularly true after January 1953, when John
Foster Dulles, who had little use for public opinion analysis,
became Secretary of State
. During his stewardship, the
surveying operations of the U .S . High Commission were sharply
curtailed, and their focus shifted from politics to U
.S.
operations .
